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Introduction
The Supreme Court’s decision in Merrill v. Yeomans1 is widely and
correctly viewed as a watershed case in which the Court first announced
that the “distinct and formal claim” has “primary importance” in
determining “precisely what it is that is patented.”2 But the reasoning
of the case relied on a pernicious myth that the patent system of the
era contained such “well-settled rules” as to “leave no excuse for
ambiguous language or vague descriptions” in textual descriptions of
inventions.3 Merrill’s myth has had unfortunate consequences, with
courts occasionally placing unrealistic demands upon inventors—and,
really, inventors’ attorneys—to write claims with a degree of clarity
that is often impossible given the technological and legal knowledge at
the time of patenting.
Merrill was an early Supreme Court patent decision in which the
outcome turned on a proper construction of the language in a patent
claim, which was then a relatively new legal innovation for demarcating
intellectual property rights that had been required by statute for less
than a half century.4 The claim asserted by the patentee may have been
†

Samuel H. McCoy II Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.

1.

94 US. 568 (1877).

2.

Id. at 570.

3.

Id. at 573.

4.

Id. at 569; see also Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 15, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (1836).
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inartfully drafted (though more on that later), and patentee argued
that the Court should give the claim “a liberal construction” that might
counterbalance the deficiencies in its drafting.5 The Court refused to do
so, and as one reason, it expressly relied on the progress achieved in
patent law in prior years.6
“The growth of the patent system in the last quarter of a century
in this country has reached a stage in its progress where,” the Court
believed, “[i]t is no longer a scarcely recognized principle, struggling for
a foothold, but it is an organized system, with well-settled rules,
supporting itself at once by its utility, and by the wealth which it
creates and commands.”7 That “developed and improved condition of
the patent law” left “no excuse for ambiguous language or vague
descriptions” in patents.8 The Court believed that the “progress” in,
and “improved condition of,” patent law and its “well-settled rules”
justified, the limiting construction that it gave to the patentee’s claim.9
This essay reexamines the claim of “progress” and “well-settled
rules” in patent law and advances three points. First, at a basic level,
the Merrill Court was clearly correct that the law in general does
exhibit progress, and in patent law, that progress has been particularly
rapid in the last two centuries. Patent claims are but one example. Two
hundred years ago, patent claims were optional curiosity—a recent
innovation of patentees’ attorneys who were seeking to define their
clients’ rights broadly, beyond the particulars of the inventive
embodiments disclosed in the drawings and descriptions of the rest of
the patent document. Today, claims are a requirement of patent
documents worldwide, and they serve an important role in defining the
scope of the intellectual property rights granted by a patent. The
practice of claim writing is now sufficiently developed that identical or
nearly identical claims help demarcate rights across multiple countries.10
Second, the Merrill Court was clearly wrong to the extent it was
asserting that the patent system at that time had “well-settled rules”
about the precise issue before the Court in the case. The Patent Office
had literally no rules relevant to the claiming issue relevant in Merrill.
The Patent Office’s “Rules and Regulations” of the era did not even
bother to list “claims” as a distinct part of the patent application, even
though the rules did contain distinct rules for the “Drawings,” the
“Model,” and the “Specification” generally. Moreover, to the extent the
5.

Merrill, 94 U.S. at 572–73.

6.

Id. at 573.

7.

Id.

8.

Id.

9.

Id. at 573–74.

10.

Compare U.S. Patent No. 9,474,534 (issued Oct. 25, 2016), with Eur. Patent
No. 2,964,200 (issued Apr. 19, 2017) (setting forth identically worded claims
to the U.S. patent).
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Patent Office’s rules addressed the formatting of claims—which was the
center of the controversy in Merrill—they did so only in a short
appendix of exemplary claims, and the example most relevant to the
issue in Merrill had the same structural issue that the Court faulted the
patentee in Merrill for having. In sum, while correct in thinking that
patent law was developing and progressing, the Court badly
overestimated the degree of progress that the law had made by the time
that the patent in Merrill had issued.
A third conclusion is that progress in the law of claiming has
occurred only slowly and in a highly decentralized manner. Finding
well-settled rules in the nineteenth-century law on patent claiming is
difficult because almost every aspect of claiming, or at least every
substantive aspect of claiming, was still in flux for decades after the
Court’s decision in Merrill. The development of patent claiming
practice appears to have been driven in the first instance by
practitioners themselves experimenting with different stylistic and
substantive formats. The Patent Office may have had the power to
enforce uniformity, but it rarely did. And, even where the Patent Office
did guide the practice, that guidance was not immune from being later
upset by judicial decisions (quite possibly including the Merrill
decision). The multiplication of claims—a development frequently, and
to some extent correctly, decried as undermining the certainty of
property rights that claims were supposed to provide—is a predictable
and rational response by attorneys to the uncertainty surrounding
claiming practice that both preceded and followed Merrill.

I. Merrill v. Yeomans and the Proper Format for
Composition of Matter Claims.
The patent in Merrill v. Yeomans was issued on May 18, 1869.11
The first sentence in the patent declares that the inventor Joshua
Merrill has “invented a new and improved Manufacture of Deodorized
Heavy Hydrocarbon-Oils, suitable for lubricating-oils, or for curriers’
use.”12 The key ambiguity in that portion of the sentence lies in the
word “Manufacture,” which could mean either the product manu–
factured or the process for manufacturing. That ambiguity continues
throughout the patent into the patent’s first claim, which reads:
I claim—
[t]he above-described new manufacture of deodorized heavy
hydrocarbon-oils, suitable for lubricating and other purposes, free
11.

U.S. Patent No. 90,284 (issued May 18, 1869); see also Merrill, 94 U.S. at
568.

12.

Id. at 1.
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from the characteristic odors of hydrocarbon-oils, and having a
slight smell like fatty oil, from heavy hydrocarbon-oils, by
treating them substantially as hereinbefore described.13

In the litigation, which commenced on March 25, 1870 (less than a
year after the patent was issued), the plaintiff asserted that
“manufacture” referred to a product.14 The defendants claimed it was
directed only to a process for making the deodorized oil and that they
could not be held liable for infringement because they were not using
that process.15
The Court began its analysis with the correct observation that
“[t]he word ‘manufacture’ in this sentence is one which is used with
equal propriety to express the process of making an article, or the article
so made.”16 The Court also noted that, “if all which is described as new
in these specifications is really so,” the inventor had made sufficient
advances to have “a right to a patent for three inventions:—
1. For a modification or improvement in the distilling apparatus.
2. For a new process or mode of distilling heavy hydrocarbon oils,
by which they are deprived of their offensive odors.
3. For the product of this new process of distillation; namely, the
deodorized heavy hydrocarbon oils fitted for use in the arts.”17

The first of these three potential inventions (the improved distilling
aparatus) was covered the patent’s second claim, but that claim was
not asserted as being infringed. The difficulty in the case was whether
the patent’s first claim to the “manufacture” covered the second or
third of the Inventions listed by the Court—i.e., covered the process or
the product.
To resolve the ambiguity, the Court relied mainly on three
arguments, which will be covered here in descending order of
persuasiveness. The Court’s first and best point concerned the language
of the claim itself, which concludes with what appears to be a process
step—“by treating [the hydrocarbon oils] substantially as hereinbefore

13.

Id. at 2 (emphasis added). The Merrill Court’s quotation of the claim has
some slight errors, but none that affects the Court’s analysis. See 94 U.S. at
570 (quoting the patent claim but adding the word “is” before “hereinbefore”
and omitting two hyphens).

14.

Transcript of Record at 1, Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 (1877) (No. 209).

15.

Id. at 3; see also Merrill, 94 U.S. at 568 (explaining that if the patent is for
the process only, then the defendants will not be found to have infringed).

16.

Merrill, 94 U.S. at 570–71.

17.

Id. at 569.
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described.”18 The Court thought that the inclusion of such a process
step resolved the ambiguity so that “the most natural meaning” of the
claim language was “I claim this new mode of manufacturing
hydrocarbon oils, by treating them as hereinbefore described.”19 That is
the Court’s best point, although the language could more naturally be
read to mean that the patentee was trying to claim what modern patent
practitioners call a “product-by-process” claim, which is a claim
directed to a product but only if that product is made by a certain
specified process.20 The trial court in Merrill had adopted that inter–
pretation,21 but because the oils sold by the defendants in the case “were
produced by a process very different from that described [in the
patent],”22 Merrill still lost his infringement case at trial. Thus, on
appeal to the Supreme Court, Merrill’s counsel “disclaim[ed]” the trial
court’s interpretation that the claim covered only a product produced
by the process described in the patent.23 That disclaimer forced the
Court to choose between reading the claim as a pure product claim or
a pure process claim, and given that choice, the Court was probably
correct that the latter reading is supported the inclusion of the process
step in the claim language.
The Court next advanced contextual arguments based on the
language in the rest of the specification. One sentence in the
specification declared that Merrill’s “invention will be used . . . to
produce the deodorized heavy oils above described.”24 In that sentence,
the Court noted, “[i]t is very clear that what he here calls his invention
is a thing which produces the deodorized oils, and not the oil itself.”25
While that’s true, the Court itself recognized that Merrill had properly
claimed his improved “distilling apparatus” as one of the two claimed
inventions in the patent.26 His reference to invention in the sentence
quoted by the Court could have been properly referring to the claimed
distilling apparatus and not his claimed new “manufacture.” In another
18.

Id. at 571 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 90,284 (issued May 18, 1869)).

19.

Id. (emphasis added).

20.

See Patent Claim, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining a
product-by-process claim as “[a] patent claim defining a product through
the process by which it is made”).

21.

Merrill v. Yeomans, 17 F. Cas. 113, 115, 117 (C.C.D. Mass. 1874) (No.
9,472), aff'd, 94 U.S. 568 (1876).

22.

Merrill, 94 U.S. at 571.

23.

Merrill, 94 U.S. at 571.

24.

Merrill, 94 U.S. at 572 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 90,284 (issued May 18,
1869)).

25.

Id.

26.

Id. at 570.

671

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020
The Myth of Well-Settled Rules in Merrill v. Yeomans

place in the specification, Merrill had used the word “manufacture” in
a way that unambiguously referred to a process,27 but a word having
two meanings could properly be used within the same document to have
one of its meanings in one sentence and the other meaning in a different
sentence. In sum, the Court’s contextual arguments are suggestive but
not dispositive.
Third and finally, the Court made a structural argument about the
patent specification, which the Court describes as being “almost wholly
directed to the apparatus, the mode of using it, and the peculiar process
of distillation.”28 “Why should this be so,” the Court asked rhetorically,
“if the applicant for the patent was only looking to the products as his
invention,—the deodorized heavy hydrocarbon oils?”29 The Court
concluded that “[i]f the oil alone was to be patented, by whatever
process made, this elaborate description of one particular process was
unnecessary.”30 That’s very clearly the Court’s worst argument, for the
Patent Act then (and still today) requires a complete disclosure of “the
manner and process of making” an invention.31 Thus, even if Merrill
intended to claim a product (the deodorized oils), he was still required
by law to disclose the details of how to make the product.
The main point here is not to relitigate the proper interpretation of
the word “manufacture” in the context of Merrill’s patent, nor to argue
that the outcome in the case was wrong. Indeed, given the Merrill’s
disclaimer of a product-by-process interpretation, the Court seems
correct in rejecting a claim interpretation that would have given Merrill
rights to all deodorized heavy oils however produced. The most
important point for purposes of this article is that, despite the opinion’s
reference to the “well-settled rules” of the patent system, the Court
cited not one authority providing a settled rule favoring its
interpretation over the alternatives. Indeed, the entire Merrill opinion

27.

Id. at 572 (noting that, in the sentence beginning “[i]n carrying on my new
manufacture of deodorizing heavy oils with this apparatus, I place the oil
to be deodorized in the still …,” the word “manufacture” must refer to the
process).

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31.

Patent Act of 1836, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (requiring disclosure of “the manner
and process of making” the invention in “full, clear, and exact terms”); 35
U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018) (requiring disclosure of “the manner and process of
making” the invention in “full, clear, concise, and exact terms”). Note that,
although Merrill was decided after the enactment of the 1870 Patent Act,
the 1836 Patent Act would have still applied to the patent in the case, as
it was issued prior to the enactment of the 1870 Act.
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contains no citations to any authority whatsoever—no case cites, no
treatises, no administrative rulings, no statutes, nothing. 32
That omission of authority was not an oversight on the Court’s
part. Attorneys of that era who sought guidance on how to write claims
would find little authoritative help, and on the issue specifically
relevant to the outcome in Merrill, the law would be filled with
uncertainty for more than a century.
At the time Merrill’s patent issued, the Patent Office had given
almost no guidance on claiming. The agency’s then-existing pamphlet
of rules, published on August 1, 1867, includes no separate section for
rules governing claims or claim format.33 By contrast, the rules
pamphlet does include separate sections for “Drawings” and “Model[s],”
each of which contains detailed rules such as a rule requiring drawings
to be “fifteen inches from top to bottom, and ten inches across” and
another rule requiring models to be “made of durable material, and not
more than one foot in length or in height, unless a larger model is
necessary to exhibit the invention.”34
The rules on claiming, to the extent that the pamphlet can be
viewed as having any such rules, are contained entirely in the ten
rules—barely two pages of text—governing the form and content of the
specification. The first of those rules states merely that “[t]he applicant
must set forth in his specification the precise invention for which he
claims a patent.”35 The next rule governs “improvements” and warns
that “the specification”—not the claims—“must distinguish between
what is admitted to be old and what is described and claimed to be the
improvement.”36 Two rules describe the agency’s general policy against
including separate inventions in the same application, with the agency
warning that it could require the applicant to “divide” an application
containing multiple inventions, but granting an exception permitting
multiple inventions in one application where they “have a necessary
and dependent connection with each other.”37 The fifth rule states
32.

See Merrill, 94 U.S. at 568–74 (citing no authority of any kind). Two
passages referring to (but not citing) the “act of Congress” and its require–
ment that a patent applicant include a “statement of his invention”—i.e., “a
distinct and specific statement of what he claims to be new, and to be his
invention”—are the closest the Court comes to citing any authority in its
opinion. Id. at 569–70.

33.

See U.S. Pat. Off., Rules and Directions for Proceedings in the
Patent Office (Aug. 1, 1867) [hereinafter 1867 Patent Rules] (setting
forth the complete set of rules governing the form and contents of a patent
application).

34.

Id. at 12 (rule 20) & at 13 (rule 23).

35.

Id. at 10 (rule 10).

36.

Id. (rule 11).

37.

Id. (rules 12 & 13).
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requirements for the application to be signed by the inventor or agent
and for the specification to describe any drawings, and it concludes with
two short examples of specifications, only one of which is complete.38
The final five rules provide details about the signatures and oaths
required for filing the application.39
The two exemplary specifications set forth with the rule provide
little information about claim drafting. The first example shows a short
but complete specification for “a new and improved mode of preventing
steam-boilers from bursting.”40 Both that introductory sentence and the
claim appear to be directed to a process, with the claim of the example
reading:
What I claim as my invention, and desire to secure by letters
patent, is the application to steam-boilers of a fusible alloy which
will melt at a given temperature and allow the steam to escape,
as herein described, using for that purpose the aforesaid metallic
compound, or any other substantially the same, and which will
produce the intended effect.41

Yet elsewhere in the exemplary specification, the disclosure reads
as if the inventor views the invention as a machine—a “steam-boiler”—
not a process for making steam-boilers safe. For example, the
specification states that “[t]o enable others skilled in the art to make
and use my invention, I will proceed to describe its construction and
operation”42 and then the specification includes a narrative from the
inventor explaining how “I construct my steam-boiler . . . ,”43 which
reads as if the invention being made is the boiler itself. In sum, the
exemplary specification seems to vary in describing the invention as a
process and as a machine.
The second example of a specification is incomplete. It instructs
how to “commence” the specification covering a machine, but the
example merely describes the claim for a machine by saying it “should
express the nature and character of the invention, and identify the parts
claimed separately or in combination.”44 In addition, a single short
sentence notes that, “[i]f the specification is for an improvement, the

38.

See id. at 10–11 (rule 14).

39.

Id. at 11–12 (rules 15–19).

40.

Id. at 10.

41.

Id. at 11.

42.

Id. at 10.

43.

Id.

44.

Id. at 11.
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original invention should be disclaimed, and the claim confined to the
improvement.”45
The agency generated a bit more guidance on claim writing in a
new rule pamphlet published on August 1, 1869.46 Though that
pamphlet did not issue until three months after the patent at issue in
Merrill, it is still relevant because, if the agency had given clear
guidance about the rules for claiming compositions of matter, Merrill’s
attorneys would still have had time prior to initiating litigation against
Yeomans to seek a reissued patent clarifying the patent’s claims.
Merrill’s attorneys would not have thought to seek reissue, however,
because the rules governing claiming were once again essentially
nonexistent in the 1869 pamphlet.47 The new rule book did contain an
appendix setting forth three brief examples for specifications covering
utility patents, including one directed to a “process” and another
directed to a “composition of matter” (see Figure 1 for the complete
example of the specification for a composition of matter).48 If Merrill’s
attorneys had looked at those examples, they would been reasonably
confident that they had succeeded in claiming a composition of matter,
not a process.

45.

Id.

46.

U.S. Pat. Off., Rules and Directions for Proceedings in the
Patent Office (Aug. 1, 1869) [hereinafter 1869 Patent Rules].

47.

As before, no separate section provides rules on claims, even though
separate sections provide rules governing the specification, the drawings and
the model. Id. at 4–7 (rules 10–30). The rules governing specifications are
nearly identical to those in the 1867 pamphlet, except the number of rules
is decreased from ten to eight by combining some of rules governing oaths.
Compare id. at 4–5, with 1867 Patent Rules, supra note 33, at 10–12.

48.

1869 Patent Rules, supra note 46, at 29–30. The other example for
specifications covers a “machine.” Id. at 27.
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Figure 1: The Exemplary Patent Specification and Claim
for a Composition of Matter Set Forth in the Patent Office’s
1869 Rules Pamphlet
The exemplary claim for a process expressly uses the word “process”
and immediately couples it (through the word “of”) with a gerund
(“applying”) to signify a step in doing something. It reads:
Claim.
We claim as our invention the process of preparing the lime as
set forth, and of applying it, when newly slacked and warm, to
wheat, before passing the latter through a smut-mill, so as to
cleanse the wheat from all impurities, substantially as described.49

That claim looks nothing like Merrill’s. By contrast, the model
claim for a composition of matter looks very much like Merrill’s claim,
for it begins by describing the invention as a “manufacture” “of” a
physical product. The claim reads:

49.

Id. at 29.
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Claim.
I claim as my invention the manufacture or preparation of a
compound, which I denominate wool oil, of the ingredients, in the
proportions, and for the purposes set forth.50

Three additional features of this sample claim deserve special
attention. First, the thing claimed is described as either the
“manufacture” or the “preparation” of a compound. Both of those
words in their noun forms can mean either the process of making or
preparing a thing or the thing that is made or prepared. In both cases,
the dominant usage of each word in the nineteenth century was to refer
to the process, with the thing produced being a secondary meaning.51
Yet the dominant usage of the word “manufacture” in U.S. patent
law was different, or at least that was the view of the then most
prominent treatise on the subject. The 1867 edition of George Curtis's
treatise on patent law noted that, while in English patent law the word
“manufacture” had come to mean both the process of making articles
and the articles so made, that meaning did not carry over to the U.S.
patent law. 52 Because the U.S. “made an enumeration of the different
classes of subjects which in England are held to be patentable, it is to
be presumed that this term [“manufacture”] was used to describe one
of these classes only, namely, fabrics or substances made by the art or
industry of man.”53 Thus, in U.S. patent law, a “manufacture” was
“presumed” to cover not processes (or, the contemporaneous word,
“arts”), but instead the “substances” made by those arts.
Second, the final portion of the claim—“for the purposes set
forth”—literally restricts the claim to covering the manufacture only
50.

Id. at 30.

51.

The best source for proving this point is the 1893 Funk & Wagnalls
Dictionary. See 1 & 2 A Standard Dictionary of the English
Language (Isaac K. Funk ed., 1893) [hereinafter Standard Dictionary].
That dictionary was published less than a quarter century after the 1869
rules, and importantly, its “sense order rule”—the rule by which it presented
numbered definitions of a word—was not “historical order” but was instead
that “the most common meaning has been given first.” 1 id. at xi. For
manufacture in its use as a noun, the dictionary gives as its first definition,
“The operation of making articles for use by working on or combining
material; the production of goods, etc., by industrial processes or art . . . .”
2 id. at 1078. For “preparation,” the first entry is “[t]he act of preparing or
fitting for some use or purpose . . . .” 2 id. at 1404. The highest ranked
definition for the thing being produced is the fourth, which defines
preparation as “[s]omething made or prepared, especially a compound,
concoction, or composition.” Id.

52.

See George Ticknor Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Patents §§ 25–27, at
19–21 (1867).

53.

Id. § 27, at 20.
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when it is used for specific purposes. Even if “manufacture” is
interpreted to be a composition of matter, modern patent law would
view a claim to a composition for certain purposes or uses as covering
a process, as § 100(b) of the Patent Act expressly defines a claim
directed to a particular “use of a . . . composition of matter” as being
a process claim.54
Third, the grammar of the claim could easily be seen as pointing
toward the claim covering a process, not a composition. The claim does
not say it is directed to “the manufacture or preparation, which is
denominated wool oil”—a format in which “manufacture or
preparation” would unambiguously be the product, the wool oil. It
instead claims “the manufacture or preparation of a compound, which
is denominated wood oil, . . . .” The wool oil is the “compound” or
composition of matter, and the claim is directed to the “manufacture
or preparation” of that compound. Reading the claim as a process seems
even more appropriate given the most common definition of
preparation, which is “[t]he act of preparing or fitting for some use or
purpose.”55 Interpreting “preparation” as an act of preparing explains
why “for the purposes set forth” appears later in the claim. This
problem with the exemplary claim seems to have been eventually
detected by the Patent Office, for in its 1871 rules pamphlet, it
eliminated the “manufacture or preparation” language and directed the
claim to cover simply “a compound.”56 But that change happened after
two years of publishing versions of the pamphlet with the model claim
for a composition of matter being directed to “the manufacture or
preparation of a compound.”57 And of course, the change in guidance
happened more than a year after Merrill had initiated the infringement
litigation against Yeomans.
In sum, the Patent Office’s contemporaneous guidance for inventors
and attorneys seeking to claim a composition of matter reads at least
as much like a process claim as the claim in Merrill. Yet the Patent
Office's publication of such a claim as a model for composition of matter
claims would not have alerted reasonable attorneys of the era that
54.

35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2018) (defining “process” to “include[] a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material”).

55.

Standard Dictionary, supra note 51, at 1404 (emphasis added).

56.

U.S. Pat. Off., Rules and Directions for Proceedings in the
Patent Office, at 39 (Aug. 1, 1871). The new version of the example reads:
“I claim, as the invention of the said [hypothetical inventor], a compound
composed of any of the oils ordinarily used on wool in its manufacture, and a
solution of oil soap, substantially in the proportions and for the purposes set
forth.” Id.

57.

In addition to the 1869 Rules, the agency's 1870 rules pamphlet included
the same language. See U.S. Pat. Off., Rules and Directions for
Proceedings in the Patent Office, at 35 (July 15, 1870).
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inclusion of some process language would undermine any attempt to
claim a composition of matter as a new manufacture. With hindsight,
the claim's flaws might be obvious, but hindsight can be deceptive in
making the hidden seem clear.
If the Patent Office’s hypothetical claim for a composition of matter
contains flaws, the source material for that claim is even worse. The
Patent Office’s hypothetical specification and claim was modeled on an
actual 1855 patent which, like the exemplary specification set forth in
the 1869 Office rules, begins with an unequivocal assertion that the
inventor believes himself to have invented a new thing, not a process
(see Figure 2 for the complete specification of the actual 1855 patent).58

Figure 2: The 1855 Patent on “Wool-Oil” Selected by the
Patent Office as the Basis for the Model Specification and
Claim Set Forth in the Agency’s 1869 Rule Pamphlet

58.

Compare U.S. Patent No. 12,964, at 1 (filed May 29, 1855), with 1869
Patent Rules, supra note 46, at 30.
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The inventor asserts that he “ha[s] invented a new and improved
compound oil, called ‘Wool-Oil,’ to be used in the manufacture of wool
in the place of olive, lard, rape-seed, or other oils.”59 Yet that claim
even more clearly seems to read like a process:
What I claim as my invention, and desire to secure by Letters
Patent, is—
The manufacture or preparation of a compound which I
denominate “wool-oil,” of the ingredients in the manner and for
the purpose set forth.60

That claim seems to incorporate process conditions governing both
the making and the using of the compound, for the claim it covers the
manufacture of a compound “in the manner” and “for the purpose” set
forth in the patent. To the extent that the Merrill Court was asserting
that patent law had “settled rules” not being followed by Merrill and
his attorneys, the very patent claim selected by the Patent Office as an
example—both in its original form and as modified by the agency in its
rule pamphlet—shows the absence of certainty about claiming
practices.
In addition to the problems in its claim language, the Patent
Office’s exemplary specification has the same inconsistencies identified
by the Supreme Court in Merrill’s specification. The exemplary
specification uses the word “manufacture” twice in sentences where the
word could refer only to a process, not to a product.61 And just as in
Merrill’s specification, the exemplary specification describes the
relevant “invention” in process terms, stating that “[t]he nature of [the]
invention . . . consists in mixing [various ingredients] with a solution of
oil soap dissolved in hot water.”62 That sentence sounds like a recipe,
and recipes are fundamentally processes—a series of steps toward
making a product. Yet the Patent Office’s example demonstrates that
inventors in 1869 could reasonably have claimed their inventions as a

59.

U.S. Patent No. 12,964, at 1 (filed May 29, 1855). The hypothetical
specification in the 1869 rule begins with the highly similar assertion that
the inventor (the agency used a pseudonym) “invented a certain compound
called ‘wool oil,’ to be used instead of lard, rape-seed, or other oils, in the
manufacture of wool.” 1869 Patent Rules, supra note 46, at 30.

60.

Id.

61.

See 1869 Patent Rules, supra note 46, at 30 (referring in separate
sentences to oil “used . . . in the manufacture of wool” and oil “used on
wool in the process of its manufacture”). In both sentences, “manufacture”
must bear its meaning as a process, even though “manufacture” in the
claim is supposed to refer to a composition of matter.

62.

Id.

680

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020
The Myth of Well-Settled Rules in Merrill v. Yeomans

recipe for making a new product and still believed that they were
obtaining patent rights covering the new product itself.
Examining the Patent Office’s contemporary guidance on
claiming—to the extent that the Patent Office had given any
guidance—shows that the Merrill Court was being unrealistic in
demanding that inventors exercise “accuracy, precision, and care in the
preparation of all the papers on which the patent is founded.”63 In
making that demand, the Court emphasized the importance of both the
public’s interest in “being clearly told what it is that limits [the public’s]
rights” and later inventors’ interests in being free to make new
improvements without being “restrained by vague and indefinite
descriptions of claims in existing patents.”64 Yet those interests cannot
be well served if, as seems nearly certain, the patent claim held out by
the Patent Office as a model for protecting a composition of matter
would not have been held to cover a composition of matter under the
Court’s analysis. Moreover, interests in providing public notice of
patent rights must be balanced against the interests of inventors in
being able to protect their inventions even though they have access to
lawyers possessing only ordinary skill in the art of patent law. Those
lawyers should not be expected to do a job better than even the Patent
Office of the time could do.
The briefing in Merrill provides a final and ultimate indication of
how little certainty there was in claiming practices at the time of
Merrill. In over 300 pages of combined briefing to the Supreme Court,
neither party to the litigation even bothers citing to the Court the
Patent Office’s guidance on claiming.65 This surprising fact is true even
though “wool oil”—the subject matter of the hypothetical composition
of matter claim in the Patent Office’s 1869 rule pamphlet—happens to
be a related technology to Merrill’s deodorized oil, so wool oil itself is
mentioned more than 20 times in the depositions and briefs that form
the record of the case at the Supreme Court.66 Furthermore, what are
today basic concepts of patent law are shown to be uncertain at the
time. Thus, for example, the defendants in the case argued it
“questionable as a matter of law, whether there can be a patent for a
new article however made.”67 If there were “settled rules” of patent law
that would allow the public to perceive “clearly” the limits of patent
63.

Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1876).

64.

Id.

65.

See Brief for Appellees, Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 573 (1877) (No. 209);
Appellant’s Brief, Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 573 (No. 209); Supplementary
Brief for Appellants, Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 573 (1877) (No. 209).

66.

See Transcript of Record, Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 573 (1877) (No. 209)
(searching “wool oil,” yields 28 instances of the phrase).

67.

Brief for Appellees at 8, Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 (1876) (No. 209)
(emphasis in original).
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rights, the parties to the Merrill litigation, and the Patent Office itself,
were not capable of finding or articulating them.
The Merrill Court's reference to the “settled rules” of patent law
is, however, subject to one interpretation that makes sense of the entire
opinion in the proper historical context. In the whole of its opinion, the
Court refers to only one principle or doctrine of patent law that the
Court itself describes as a “rule.” That rule, which the Court recognizes
as supported court precedents cited by the parties (but uncited in the
Court’s opinion), is that, “where it appears that a valuable invention
has really been made, this court, giving full effect to all that is found
in the application on which the Patent Office acted, will uphold that
which was really invented, and which comes within any fair inter–
pretation of the patentee's assertion of claim.”68 The Court expressly
states that “this rule”—that claims should be interpreted, if fairly
possible, to cover what is “really invented”—is being followed in the
case. That passage in the Court’s opinion provides the best key to
understanding what core rule of patent law was relevant to the case
and was really settled at the time of Merrill. It was not a rule about
the style or format of writing claims; it was a rule about how courts
should approach construing claims in light of the actual technological
contributions disclosed by the inventor.
Merrill’s contribution in the field was in developing a process
to deodorize heavy oils and in using that process to produce a product.
But as the Court noted early in its opinion, Merrill was able to describe
the article produced—to the extent he could describe it not in terms of
the process by which it is made—only “in short terms” with the “main
feature” of the article described as being “its freedom from the offensive
odor which, before his invention, seemed to be an inseparable quality
of those oils.”69 If omniscient attorneys had tried to write a pure product
claim—i.e., not a product-by-process claim—to cover such a product,
could they have done so based on Merrill’s then-existing knowledge of
the product? The answer is almost certainly “no.”
Merrill’s knowledge of the product, as disclosed in the patent
specification, encompassed two facts. First, the product was produced
by his process. Second, the product had a functionally desirable
feature—it did not smell bad. The first fact would support a productby-process claim, but as the trial court's decision proved, such a claim
would not help Merrill win his case (and hence his attorneys disclaimed
that interpretation of the actual claim in the Supreme Court). If the
product is not defined by the process that made it, it could be defined
only by the functional feature—the lack of an offensive odor. Yet

68.

Merrill, 94 U.S. at 573.

69.

Id. at 569.
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compositions of matter, just like other inventions, cannot be defined in
purely functional terms.
That last point is clear today, and backed up by multiple
Supreme Court decisions condemning purely functional claiming both
generally and in composition of matter claims.70 Indeed, the section of
the modern Patent Act governing claim format (§ 112) permits
attorneys to define a claim element in terms of its ability to perform a
function only if that element is not the only element in the claim, and
then still the functional claim language is limited by the means or steps
for performing the function that are disclosed in the patent’s
specification.71
Yet even in the second half of the nineteenth century, the
ability of an inventor to claim a composition of matter solely in terms
of its function was doubtful at best. For example, Robinson’s 1890
patent law treatise states that a composition of matter claim had to
disclose the elements of the composition and “the mode of their
union.”72 To back up that point, Robinson relied on the 1868 Goodyear
v. Berry case for the proposition that “a Claim for a chemical
composition covers only the same use of the same or equivalent
ingredients.”73 The Goodyear v. Berry court was even more clear on the
point, stating that, for patented chemical compositions, “the exclusive
right to the invention imports nothing but protection against the use
of the same, or substantially the same elements compounded and treated
on principles substantially the same as those of the patented article.”74
The court summed up the point by stating that “a patent right does
not cover every possible mode of accomplishing the result proposed by
an inventor.”75

70.

Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 12 (1946)
(invalidating a “functional claim” due to its “broadness, ambiguity, and
overhanging threat”); General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304
U.S. 364, 371(1938) (invalidating a claim for using “conveniently functional
language at the exact point of novelty”); Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins
Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 257 (1928) (rejecting the idea that a composition of
matter claim can be defined “by describing the product exclusively in terms
of its use or function”).

71.

See 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). See also Robert P. Merges & John F. Duffy, Patent
Law and Policy 39–40 (8th ed. 2021) (discussing the limitations of § 112(f)
including the prohibition on “single means” claims—claims with only one
element defined in functional terms).

72.

2 William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents § 532, at 148 (1890).

73.

Id. § 532 n.3, at 148 (emphasis added) (citing Goodyear v. Berry, 10 F. Cas.
631 (C.C.D. S. Ohio 1868) (No. 5,556)).

74.

Goodyear, 10 F. Cas. at 635 (emphasis added).

75.

Id.
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Thus, the best view of the Court’s decision in Merrill is that
the Court followed its settled rule of matching patent rights to what
the inventor “really invented.” For Merrill’s invention, that rule meant
rights to a process or to a product-by-process, neither of which would
win Merrill his infringement case against Yeomans. If Merrill wanted
more—if he wanted to push the envelope of what he could possibly
claim given his technological contribution—the Court suggested that
he should “surrender” his current patent and seek a “reissue.”76 That
administrative procedure would have allowed the Patent Office to pass
on whether Merrill could define his product—his deodorized heavy
oils—in some acceptable way that did not rely on the process for
making it and that did not describe the product in purely functional
terms.

II. Developments After Merrill: Continued
Uncertainty in Claiming
Merrill raised the prominence of claims, but it would be a major
mistake to believe that the rising importance of claims produced more
certainty in claiming practices. For decades after Merrill declared
claims as “of primary importance” in defining patent rights, the Patent
Office continued to include essentially no meaningful rules about
claiming even while it continued to have, for example, multiple rules
covering the formatting of drawings.
The agency’s rule pamphlets continued to provide examples, but
just as the 1869 example for claiming a composition of matter probably
was not reliable, other exemplary claims contained some nasty surprises
for attorneys who followed them. For example, from 1869 onward, the
agency’s exemplary claims for machines had always included reference
letters relating the elements of the claims to the drawings. For example,
one machine claim in the agency's 1888 rule pamphlet reads: “The
combination, in a meat-chopping machine, of the reciprocating rod H,
carrying the knives d d, the cross-head C, . . . .”77 While that
convention was not required by rule—the rules said only that the
“description” in the specification had to include references to the
drawings “by letters or numerals”78—the vast majority of applicants

76.

Merrill, 94 U.S. at 573.

77.

U.S. Pat. Off., Rules of Practice in the United States Patent
Office 70 (Apr. 18, 1888).

78.

Id. at 12. The 1869 rules had also not required claims to have reference
letters but had instead said merely that the “specification should describe
the drawings, . . . and refer by letters and figures to the different parts.”
1869 Patent Rules, supra note 46, at 5.
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followed the agency’s exemplary machine claim and included letters to
connect the claim elements to the drawings.79
That practice, though encouraged by the Patent Office’s claim
examples, declined swiftly following the Supreme Court’s 1888 decision
in Weir v. Morden, which used the presence of such reference characters
to narrow a claim based on the particular configuration of the elements
shown in the drawings.80 The inventor in that case otherwise had a
pretty good argument for a broader construction of the claim based on
the claim’s text and the principle of “claim differentiation.”81 The
drawing references, however, led to a narrow interpretation and a
complete loss in the infringement litigation for the inventor.82 A dozen
years after Weir, only 22% of claims included such references to the
drawings; two decades later, the practice was nonexistent.83
While providing little or no guidance in the form of rules, the
Patent Office was continuing after 1869 to provide a stream of
published decisions by the Commissioner (then the agency’s head)
concerning issues of patent law, including the proper form and scope of
patent claims.84 To be sure, most Commissioner decisions did not
concern patent claims. Issues addressed included points on novelty,
interferences, patent term extensions, joint inventorship, the format for
oaths and internal office procedure.85 Still, over the course of decades,
administrative decisions became an important source of precedents
concerning the style and substance of claims.
Commissioner decisions were, however, much like judicial decisions
in the sense that they were always counterpunches. Patent attorneys
were the first movers. They had to decide on format, scope, and number
of claims. They were the ones innovating, not the agency and not the
courts.
Moreover, the agency was a middle-tier player. Unlike the courts,
the agency could not definitively rule on the propriety of a format or,
79.

See Ridsdale Ellis, Patent Claims § 6, at 7 (1949) (setting forth data
showing 83% of claims in 1880 included reference characters connecting
claim elements to the drawings).

80.

125 U.S. 98, 107 (1888).

81.

See Merges & Duffy, supra note 71, at 660–64 (discussing the use of, and
limitation on, the canon of “claim differentiation,” which creates a general
presumption that different claims should be interpreted to have different
scopes).

82.

Id. at 107–08.

83.

See Ellis, supra note 79, § 6, at 7 (setting forth data showing 22% of
claims in 1900, and 0% in 1920, included drawing reference characters in
the claims).

84.

See id.

85.

See id.
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as in the case of including drawing references in claims, on the
consequences of that format.86 That position meant that the agency was
generally willing to give attorneys substantial latitude in choosing not
only the number of claims (as discussed below in Part III), but also the
format. For example, an early Commissioner decision made clear that
the use of drawing references in claims was optional only—an option
that many patentees would (wisely) decline after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Weir.87
Precisely because the agency did not, and perhaps could not, create
and maintain settled rules about patent claiming, certainty on any
particular point was elusive. Once again, the patent in Merrill provides
a good example of that continuing uncertainty.
Though the Supreme Court held the claim at issue in Merrill to be
a product claim, that interpretation was not obviously correct. The trial
court in Merrill interpreted the claim to be directed to a product, but
only to the product as produced by a particular process. The trial judge
reasoned that it was permissible for a patentee “to claim broadly the
new product, however made, or to claim the new product when made
by a described process.”88 That latter interpretation, the judge opined,
“is the only one which appears to us to be admissible, and the only one
consistent with the language used by the patentee, and one which most
effectually, probably, secures to him the product of his invention.”89
Under that interpretation, Merrill claimed “a heavy hydrocarbon oil
having the characteristics described in the patent, and produced by
treating the oils in the manner described in the patent.”90 Because the
defendant in the case had not used oils that had been produced in the
manner disclosed by Merrill, the infringement case failed.91
At the Supreme Court, Merrill’s attorneys chose to “disclaim” that
claim interpretation.92 Both Merrill’s attorneys and the Court focused
86.

See id.

87.

Ex parte Parker, 1871 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 293, 294 (holding that a patent
examiner was wrong to require the claims to include letters of reference to
the drawings because it was a “fallacy” to believe that “by the use of these
letters the scope of the claim can be more accurately defined than by the
use of proper descriptive words”). The Commissioner also opined that the
letters of reference were “for convenience merely, and in themselves have no
significance.” Id. The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Weir would
prove the Commission wrong on that final point. See Weir v. Morden, 125
U.S. 98, 108 (1888).

88.

Merrill v. Yeomans, 17 F. Cas. 113, 116 (C.C.D. Mass. 1874) (No. 9,472).

89.

Id.

90.

Id.

91.

Id. at 117.

92.

See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 571 (1876).
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attention on the meaning of “manufacture,” but that framing of the
case obscured a point of uncertainty that would persist for more than
a century.93
What modern attorneys would call a product-by-process claim
would eventually be expressly blessed as “proper” by the Commissioner
of Patents in the 1891 decision Ex parte Painter.94 That decision
concerned a patent claim in which “each clause claims an article
qualified by the process of making it,” and the Commissioner considered
the patent examiner’s objection to the claim as resting on the view that
“a claim may never define an article of manufacture by any reference
to the manner of making it.”95 In rejecting the examiner’s position, the
Commissioner reasoned that, although “as a rule a claim for an article
of manufacture should not be defined by the process of producing that
article,” there was an “exception to the rule” where an “article cannot
be properly defined and discriminated from the prior art otherwise than
by reference to the process of producing it.”96
The Commissioner’s decision in Painter would eventually become a
standard citation in court opinions and treatises for the propriety of
product-by-process claims,97 but four points highlight the degree to
which the Commissioner of Patents was not leading the development
of settled rules about claiming.
First, the Painter decision was actually overruling an earlier
Commissioner decision that was not even 15 years old. The 1877 Ex
parte Cobb decision had recognized the supposedly “invariable
requirement of the Commissioner that from a claim for a new ‘article
of manufacture’ there shall be eliminated all reference to the process”
employed in making the article.98 The 1891 Painter decision acknowl–
edged this prior agency precedent (while avoiding actually citing the
earlier decision) but disparaged the precedent on the ground that the
judicial decisions cited by Cobb did not support any rule against
defining a product by the process of making it.99 Cobb and Painter
together demonstrate the unsettled state of rules governing claiming.
Second, though left entirely unmentioned in the agency’s Painter
decision, the Supreme Court’s 1877 decision in Smith v. Goodyear
93.

Id. at 570–72.

94.

1891 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 200, 200.

95.

Id.

96.

Id. at 200–01.

97.

See Ellis, supra note 79, § 449 at 565 (citing Painter as the “earliest case”
holding that a “product may be defined by its process of manufacture when
there is no other satisfactory method of defining it”).

98.

1874 Dec. Comm’n Pat. 60, 60.

99.

Painter, 1891 Dec. Comm’n Pat. at 200 (citing the two judicial precedents
also cited in Cobb).
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Dental Vulcanite Co. had squarely held that an invention could be
defined as “a product or manufacture made in a defined manner.”100
The claim at issue in Smith did not expressly include process terms.
Rather, it was merely in the format of a specific product “substantially
as described.”101 The Smith Court interpreted that “substantially as
described” clause as implicitly limiting the claimed product to only a
product produced using the process set for the patent specification. Yet
if the Supreme Court could hold that the product claim without any
express process limitations may be implicitly limited to a product
produced by a specific process, there would seem to be no good reason
why patent attorneys could not draft claims expressly claiming products
produced by a process.
Third, the Painter decision began its analysis by relying on a
judicial decision, although oddly enough that judicial decision was not
the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Smith v. Goodyear Dental
Vulcanite. Instead, Painter relied on the 1884 circuit court decision in
Globe Nail Co. v. U.S. Horse Nail Co., which had involved a claim to
a nail that was defined by a series of process steps (e.g., “made by
punching or cutting from hot-rolled ribbed bars of metal”) capable of
“produc[ing] the peculiar qualities specified.”102 The Commissioner was
not, however, relying on any holding of the court because, as the
Commissioner’s decision expressly notes, “no question was made but
that it was a proper claim.”103 In other words, the judges did not
consider the propriety of the claim format because the attorneys for the
defendant did not challenge it (quite possibly because they were aware
of Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite). Thus, in relying on the form
of the claim in Globe Nail, the Commissioner was relying not on the
1884 judicial decision in the case (because the judges were never
presented arguments about the claim’s format), but on (1) an 1869
decision of a private attorney to draft the claim in that format,104 (2)
the contemporaneous decision of an examiner to allow the claim in that
100. Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 493 (1877).
101. Id. (quoting U.S. Pat. Re. 1,904 (1865)).
102. 19 F. 819, 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1884). The complete claim, which was also
set forth in the Painter decision, is:
A nail made by punching or cutting from hot-rolled ribbed bars of
metal a headed blank, substantially as described, and by elongating,
hardening, and compressing the shanks of such blanks by coldrolling from the head to the point, thereby giving to all parts of the
nail so produced the peculiar qualities specified.
Id.; see also Ex parte Painter, 1891 Dec. Comm’r Pat. at 200 (quoting the
claim).
103. Ex parte Painter, 1891 Dec. Comm’r Pat. at 200.
104. See U.S. Patent No. 92,355 (filed July 6, 1869).
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format, and (3) the litigation decision of the defendants in Globe Nail
to forego challenging the format of the patent claim. In sum, patent
lawyers were using the product-by-process claim format long before the
Commissioner’s 1891 decision to accept the format.
Fourth, the Commissioner’s Painter decision did not, and could not,
control how such a product-by-process claim would be interpreted in
infringement litigation. For more than a century, two views percolated
through the courts and commentators. The first and dominant view
was that such a claim was infringed only if the accused product was
proven as having been produced by the process mentioned in the
claim.105 An alternative view was that a product-by-process claim was
every bit as broad as any other product claim and would be infringed
by any product without regard to how it was produced.106 Under that
latter theory, the process elements in the product-by-process claim were
merely intended to define the product in cases where the structural
features of the product could not be determined given the limitations
in the existing technology.
The historical conflict between those two views was finally resolved
(or at least apparently so, assuming that the Supreme Court does not
take up the issue) by an en banc decision of the Federal Circuit only in
2009107—more than 130 years after the Merrill decision and more than
a century after the Commissioner’s decision formally ratifying productby-process claims! The en banc decision embraced the view described
above as the first and dominant view, but in doing so, it had to
expressly overrule a 1991 panel decision applying the alternative view.108
The en banc court was also not unanimous, with three of the longesttenured judges on the court dissenting.109
In sum, the deep uncertainty surrounding the very claim format
used in Merrill—and the survival of that uncertainty for more than a
105. See, e.g., Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 493 (1877);
Atlantic Thermoplastics Co., Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 842 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (describing a line of cases holding that product-by-process claims
inquiries focus “on whether the accused product was made by the claimed
process”).
106. See, e.g., Scripps Clinic & Rsch. Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565,
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he correct reading of product-by-process claims
is that they are not limited to product prepared by the process set forth in
the claims.”).
107. Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en
banc).
108. Id. at 1293 (embracing the rule “that the process terms limit product-byprocess claims” in infringement analyses and “expressly overrul[ing]” Scripps
Clinic & Rsch. Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
109. See id. at 1299 (Newman, J., joined by Mayer & Lourie, JJ., dissenting). At
the time, Judges Newman and Mayer were the longest tenured judges on the
court, and Judge Lourie was the fifth most senior judge.
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century after the case—gives lie to Supreme Court’s assertion that
patent law in 1877 had developed sufficiently “well-settled” rules that
the patentee’s alternative interpretation of the patent claim could be as
easily discounted as the Court had done. 110 This point is easy for
modern commentators to overlook. For example, the claim in Merrill is
used as an example in an article by Professors Chiang and Solum, who
assert that “[o]nce read in context, it becomes quite clear that the word
‘manufacture’ in the claim refers to a process and not a product.”111 In
addition to context, they rely on the application of “some ordinary rules
of grammar” to argue:
A sentence that read, “I claim the above described new
manufacture of the deodorized heavy hydrocarbon oils . . . from [
untreated] hydrocarbon oils, by treating them substantially as is
hereinbefore described,” would make no grammatical sense if
“manufacture” was being used to denote a product. By
considering the surrounding context and applying some ordinary
rules of grammar, we can arrive at the correct linguistic
meaning.112

Is this really so? Do the rules of grammar quite clearly dictate such
a meaning? There are three reasons to doubt that assertion.
First, the trial judge in the case wrote a considered opinion in which
he came to the opposite conclusion—that the claim covered a product
not just a process—and he thought that conclusion was “the only one
which appears to us to be admissible.”113 It is true that the trial judge
believed that the claim covered only the product when produced by a
particular process, so that the end result was the same (the
infringement case failed). Yet still his “only … admissible” was quite
different from the the “quite clear” linguistic meaning posited by
Chiang and Solum.
Second, Chiang and Solum do not cite any source for the “ordinary
rules of grammar” supporting their interpretation, and it’s unlikely that
any standard or widely used books of grammar available to sophis–
ticated lawyers and judges contain grammatical rules detailed enough
to resolve the issue whether “manufacture,” in its meaning as a product,
can properly be modified by the clauses “from hydrocarbon oils” and
“by treating them . . . .” Indeed, it seems doubtful that such any such
rule of grammar exists. The word “manufacture” is similar to a number
of similar words such as building, creation, fabrication, preparation,
110. See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 US. 568, 573 (1877).
111. Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction
Distinction in Patent Law, 123 Yale L.J. 530, 550 (2013).
112. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570
(1876)).
113. Merrill v. Yeomans, 17 F. Cas. 113, 116 (C.C.D. Mass. 1874) (No. 9,472).
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assembly, etc., each of which can mean the process of making a thing
or the thing produced. Now consider this sentence:
I claim the assembly of a beautiful puzzle, suitable for framing,
from one hundred parts, by piecing them together.

The object of that sentence could mean the process of assembly,
but it can also refer to the finished product without violating any rules
of grammar. To see this, add the adjective “completed” to the sentence
so that it reads:
I claim the completed assembly of a beautiful puzzle, suitable for
framing, from one hundred parts, by piecing them together.

The adjective “completed” resolves of the ambiguity so that the object
is now clearly the product, but the sentence is still grammatically
correct.
Third, even where a particular claim has linguistic certainty, that
certainty is not legally dispositive. The text of the relevant statute
defines infringement as the unauthorized making, using, offering for
sale, etc., of the “patented invention.”114 Nothing in that statute, or in
the other general statutes governing the cause of action for infringe–
ment,115 state that “the patented invention” is defined exclusively by
the claims. The case law confirms the contrary is true: defendants may
infringe the patented invention even though they avoid the literal
meaning of the claims116 and, conversely, may not infringe even though
they act within the literal meaning of the claims.117 Thus, complete
certainty in claiming—which was present neither in the time of Merrill
nor in the present time—would not bring certainty in defining patent
property rights.
114. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018). Chiang & Solum describe the schism between
judges who pursue “the linguistic meaning of claim text” and those who
seek “the true invention” as part of the “age-old conflict between textualism
and anti-textualism.” Chiang & Solum, supra note 111, at 573. Yet in the
context of an infringement case, judges who seek to find the “patented
invention,” rather than the linguistic meaning of claim text, may be the real
textualists because they are following the commands of § 271.
115. 35 U.S.C. §§ 281–82 (2018).
116. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 17–18 (1997)
(holding a patent may be infringed under the doctrine of equivalents even
when defendant’s activities avoid the literal language of the claims).
117. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898) (holding
that the patentee cannot hold the defendant liable for infringement even
where the defendant has acted “within the letter” of the patent claims, if the
defendant “has so far changed the principle of the device that the claims of
the patent, literally construed, have ceased to represent [the patentee’s]
actual invention”).
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III. A Contemporaneous Solution to Uncertainty: The
Multiplicity of Claims.
Given the lack of settled rules for claiming, one of the most
important decisions of the Patent Office was to allow a multiplicity of
claims so that inventors’ attorneys could experiment with different
claiming formats. That decision came in Ex parte Perry & Lay,118 which
was rendered the same year, 1869, that Merrill received his patent. It
was one of the earliest recorded decisions of the Commissioner of
Patents (it was the second decision reported in the first volume of the
series “Decisions of the Commissioner of Patents,” which would
eventually span one century of volumes). The Commissioner there
considered whether the seventh claim in an application for a reissued
patent was properly “disallowed on the ground that it was substantially
embraced in the first claim.”119 The Commissioner ruled that the ground
“does not appear to me to be a valid objection” because “[i]t is
admissible, upon proper restrictions, for parties to put their claims in
different forms to prevent misconstructions of them by the public or by
the courts.”120
The reissue patent for Perry and Lay, which covered an improved
marine reciprocating steam engine, issued on March 30, 1869, less than
three months after the Commissioner’s decision.121 It contained seven
claims, each set forth in a quite different format. Three of the seven
claims seem equivalent to what a modern patent lawyer would call
“dependent claims.” Each of those three begins with the word “Also,”
and each provides additional details, elements and limitations relevant
to a preceding claim.122 The four “independent” claims (claims 1, 2, 4
& 7) claim the invention in varying formats. Claim 1 is set forth in a
strikingly modern format, with a preamble naming the invention (“A
vertical compound-engine”) followed by a transition word (“having”)
and then followed by various elements (cylinders, a continuous pistonrod, etc.) and the interrelations of those elements.123 Claims 2 and 4 are
set forth in two variants of the now antiquated “combination” format,
118. Ex parte Perry & Lay, 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 3.
119. Id. at 3.
120. Id.
121. See U.S. Patent No. 65,003, at 1 (issued Mar. 30, 1869) (entitling the patent
“Improvement in Reciprocating Steam-Engines” and specifying in the
patent’s first sentence that the invention involves “Marine Steam-Engines”).
122. See id. at 2 (claims 3, 5 & 6). Claim 3 seems to qualify claim 2 by adding
two new elements—a “sleeve” and a “packing-box”—and specifying the
relation of those new elements to the engine cylinders introduced in claim 2.
Id. Claims 5 and 6 similarly qualify the independent claim 4. Id.
123. Id.
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with claim 2 structured as “[t]he combination and arrangement of [one
element] with [other elements],” and claim 4 structured as “[i]n
combination with [several elements], the [additional element].”124 Claim
7 specifies only the “sustaining part,” which appears to be the chief
innovation in the patent, and then details that single part’s relationship
with the other parts (e.g., the “the two cylinders” and the “piston-rod”)
of a “marine engine.”125
By modern standards, the reissue patent to Perry and Lay had a
very modest number of claims, but in 1869, the inclusion of seven claims
was on the high side for number of claims in a patent. Many patents
still concluded with only a single claim.126 The Patent Office’s thenexisting rule pamphlet provided exemplary applications for only two
inventions, each of which had only one claim.127 Indeed, in describing
its example for a patent on a machine, the Patent Office pamphlet
stated that the specification should conclude with “the claim,” in the
singular.128 One rule only suggested that multiple claims were
permissible. That rule generally provided that “[t]wo or more distinct
and separate inventions may not be claimed in one application,” but it
provided an exception that “where several inventions have a necessary
and dependent connection with each other, so that all co-operate in
attaining the end which is sought, they may be so claimed.”129 That
rule did not, however, authorize either expressly or by implication that
applicants could write redundant claims in differing formats.
Of course, sophisticated practitioners would have been aware that
the Supreme Court in O’Reilly v. Morse had sustained seven of Morse’s
eight claims, so there was obviously no per se bar to multiple claims.130
Similarly, the 1837 statute justifying the O’Reilly Court’s decision to
refuse to award Morse costs at least arguably contemplated multiple
claims, although the statute was not worded as its modern descendant
is. The modern version of the statute denying costs for infringement
124. Id. at 2.
125. Id.
126. For examples of single-claim patents issued on the very same day as the
Perry & Lay reissued patent, see, for example, U.S. Patent No. 88,431, at
2 (filed Mar. 30, 1869); U.S. Patent No. 88,494, at 1 (filed Mar. 30, 1869);
U.S. Patent No. 88,369, at 1 (filed Mar. 30, 1869); U.S. Patent No. 88,370,
at 1 (filed Mar. 30, 1869).
127. 1867 Patent Rules, supra note 33, at 10–11. The rules provided one
complete example of an application covering a process, which ended with
one claim. The other example, which was directed to a machine invention,
merely described in words how the application should be written.
128. Id. at 11.
129. Id. at 10.
130. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 121–22 (1853).
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plaintiffs, 35 U.S.C. § 288, is entitled “Action for infringement of a
patent containing an invalid claim,” and its text plainly contemplates
patents having multiple claims.131 The equivalent 1837 statute denied
victorious plaintiffs costs if they failed to file “a disclaimer of all that
part of the thing patented which was so claimed without right.”132 The
phrasing of that statute could have been interpreted as permitting the
disclaimer of a “part” rather than of a distinct claim among a
multiplicity of claims. It was not until the Patent Act of 1870 that
statutory law expressly contemplated multiple claims in a single
patent.133
The lawyers for Perry and Lay were obviously very good at their
craft, for not only were they creative enough to write repetitive claims
in different formats (and appeal a rejection when lower level officials
tried to stop them from doing so), they also claimed the invention in
quite different formats—one format that continues to thrive today
(claim 1), another format that was used for decades before falling out
of favor in the twentieth century (the combination format of claims 2
and 4), and one format that was used in the mid-nineteenth century
but seems to have lost popularity rather quickly (claim 7, which focused
specifically on the innovative piece of the whole engine).
The Commissioner’s decision in Perry & Lay—albeit very short—
also points out the most important reason for permitting redundant
claims: the different formats provides insurance against “miscon–
structions of them . . . by the courts.”134 The decision, however, did not
give attorneys carte blanche to multiply claims, as it allowed redundant
claims only with “proper restrictions.”135 In the decades following that
decision, the Patent Office, the courts, and the practicing bar would
struggle to find the correct balance between providing freedom for
attorneys to write claims in creative ways and imposing “proper
restrictions” on excessively numerous claims.

131. 35 U.S.C. § 288 (2018) (forbidding the awarding of costs to a plaintiff that
prevails on an action for “infringement of a claim of the patent . . . unless a
disclaimer of the invalid claim has been entered at the Patent and Trademark
Office before the commencement of the suit”). Many other provisions of the
modern Patent Act expressly contemplate multiple claims. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)
(2018) (providing that the specification “shall conclude with one or more
claims”); 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2018) (providing that “[e]ach claim of a
patent . . . shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other
claims”).
132. Act of March 3, 1837, ch. 45, § 9, 5 Stat. 191, 194 (emphasis added).
133. See Act of July 8, 1870, cg. 230, § 46, 16 Stat. 198, 204–05 (permitting
appeals for any of the “claims” twice rejected during examination).
134. Ex parte Perry & Lay, 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 3.
135. Id.
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Later in the same year as the Perry & Lay decision, the
Commissioner rendered a decision placing one limit on including
multiple claims in a single patent, but it was a very modest limit. In
Ex parte Yale, the Commissioner ruled that the applicant could not
place three claims into the same patent application where two were
directed to a new mailbox and the third was directed to the lock on the
box.136 As the Commissioner expressly stated, however, the rule was not
designed to limit the number of potential claims but merely to prevent
applicants from including “many inventions in one patent [so as to]
deprive the Government of its proper fees.”137 The result was merely to
require a division of the application, and the payment of an additional
filing fee ($15 at the time).138
Four years after the Commissioner’s decision in Perry & Lay, the
Supreme Court in Carlton v. Bokee considered a reissued patent in
which “[t]he single claim of the original patent is expanded into seven
distinct claims.”139 The Carlton Court seemed to condemn the “needless
multiplication” of claims in its statement that, “where a specification
by ambiguity and a needless multiplication of nebulous claims is
calculated to deceive and mislead the public, the patent is void.”140 But
the statement was not a strong prohibition on patents having numerous
claims. The Court’s wrath extended only to “needless” multiplication
of “nebulous” claims that were “calculated to deceive and mislead,” and
in that case, the Court found that the patentee had used the reissue
process by “intersperse[ing]” within the patent’s original specification
material that was “evidently borrowed from subsequent experience and
events.”141 Indeed, the Court expressly stated that it was not deciding
whether “a repetition of substantially the same claim in different words
will vitiate a patent.”142
Courts and commentators continued to condemn the presence of
seemingly excessive claims in patents, but the practice grew. In a 1916
opinion, the Second Circuit adopted as its own an opinion by thenDistrict Judge Learned Hand, who condemned a patent containing 48
claims as “violat[ing] the very purpose of any claims at all, which is to

136. Ex parte Linus Yale, Jr., 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 110.
137. Id. at 111.
138. Id. The Commissioner reminded readers that this fee was “a very reasonable
charge” and that generally the U.S. fees for all services of the Patent Office
“are less than are charged in any other country, while the service performed
for the applicant by the office is much greater.” Id.
139. 84 U.S. 463, 471 (1873).
140. Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 471.
142. Id. at 472.
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define the forbidden field.”143 That statement was, however, dicta, as
the court found the two claims asserted from the patent to be not
infringed by the defendant’s product.144 Similarly, a 1922 treatise
described a patent containing 277 claims as “a very close approach to
the ridiculous” and opined that some reform was needed for “this gross
abuse of practise to be consigned to oblivion.”145 Yet even that treatise
writer recognized from his own practice experience the need for “claims
of many kinds to protect adequately inventions” involving “modern
complicated machinery.”146 Dissenting in a 1942 decision, Justice Black,
joined by Justices Douglas and Murphy, thought the Court’s
statements in Carlton justified voiding a patent containing 137 claims
with more words devoted to the claims (14,000) than to the whole rest
of the patent (11,000).147 Nevertheless, the result in the case was that
the Court majority held valid and infringed all five claims (out of the
137) that had been asserted by the patentee.148
By 1949, the mid-twentieth century’s leading treatise writer on
patent claiming—Ridsdale Ellis—would note that, despite occasional
judicial condemnations of patents with a large number of claims, “there
are numerous cases of patents containing substantially duplicate claims
being upheld without criticism or injuriously restricted interpre–

143. Victor Talking Mach. v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 229 F. 999, 1001 (2d Cir.
1916) (setting forth the district court opinion as the basis for affirmance).
144. Id.
145. John F. Robb, Patent Essentials for the Executive, Engineer,
Lawyer and Inventor 201–02 (1922). The patent singled out in the
treatise was U.S. Patent No. 1,043,882 (issued Nov. 12, 1912), which has
less than seven pages of specification prior to the thirty-nine pages devoted
to the 277 claims. Almost all of the claims are written in the “combination”
format, with the first words in the claim being either “In a machine of the
character described, the combination with . . . ” or “the combination of
. . . ,” but a few claims are drafted in slightly different formats. Id. at 201;
see U.S. Patent No. 1,043,882 (issued Nov. 12, 1912).
146. Robb, supra note 145, at 207. The Robb treatise also believed that
attorneys were multiplying claims excessively because they were “too fearful
of failing to cover the invention properly” and were not “giv[ing] due weight
to the fact that the courts exist to give effect to the protection of the patent
for all real invention present.” Id. at 201–202. Yet, as Merrill and many
other cases show, the courts do not always protect “all real invention
present”—nor should they. If claims have some role—any role—in defining
property rights, then courts must be willing at some point to restrict the
scope of patent rights based on the claims even if real invention is described
elsewhere in the patent.
147. Williams Co. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 316 U.S. 364, 371–82 (1942)
(Black, J., joined by Douglas & Murphy, JJ., dissenting).
148. Id. at 371.
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tations.”149 Subsequent history suggests an even more permissive
attitude to patents with numerous claims.
The current acceptance of large numbers of claims seems puzzling
at first. Learned Hand is right (as he usually is) that numerosity in
claiming undermines the function of claims, which are supposed to
define the boundaries of intellectual property rights. Property deeds do
not contain dozens or hundreds of metes and bounds, each set of which
may or may not provide the correct demarcation of the property rights.
Why does our legal system tolerate such complexity and imprecision in
patent law? The answer here turns on the inherent difficulty in
developing the law defining patent right boundaries. As the practice of
defining boundaries has developed in a decentralized fashion, it
necessarily develops incrementally, and in fits and starts. There are
wrong turns, abandoned experiments, and general uncertainty about
the permissible style and substance of proper patent boundaries. In such
an environment—one inherently lacking the “settled rules” that the
Merrill Court mistakenly perceived 140 years ago—tolerating numerous
claims has value in permitting continued experimentation, and
continued progress, in the law of claiming.

Conclusion: Matching Patent Rights to What
Was “Really Invented”
I conclude with a confession. This essay started out with a tentative
title something like “The Patent Office’s Leadership in Developing the
Claiming of Patent Rights.” The essay was going to trace the
development of modern claiming practices through the guiding admin–
istrative decisions of the Patent Office, but that essay could not be
written because the tentative thesis turned out to be not true. The
development of modern claiming practices is a much more complicated
story in which practicing lawyers first and foremost developed claiming
styles, and the agency and courts slowly reacted to those styles. Nowstandard practices grew slowly and fitfully, and significant areas of
uncertainty persisted through many decades. Indeed, many uncer–
tainties survive to this day.
The leaderless development of claiming practices may help to
explain why lawyers sought greater numbers of claims. Several different
formats for claiming the same type of invention continued to exist in
parallel for decades, and attorneys could not be certain how those
claims would be viewed by courts in the future. Multiplying claims was
a pragmatic solution to the uncertainty, and despite some prominent
complaints about excessive numbers of claims, the agency and the
courts largely let patent attorneys have their fill of claims.
This history also raises the larger point that courts should avoid
overestimating the degree to which patent law has sufficiently well149. Ellis, supra note 79, § 158, at 191.
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settled rules of claiming so that claims can achieve precision in defining
property rights. Two subsidiary points follow, both of which are evident
in Merrill.
First, courts should avoid using hindsight in construing patent
claims. The problem of hindsight in patent law is frequently raised as
a warning to courts against overestimating what would have been
“obvious” to a person of skill in the relevant technological art in an
earlier time period.150 Yet the problem can equally arise in adjudicating
the scope and meaning of patent claims, with hindsight overestimations
of what would have been clear in the legal art of writing claims at the
time the claims were written.
The history of the underlying patent in Merrill provides an
excellent example. Despite the Supreme Court’s positing of “well-settled
rules” in the patent system of 1877, the rules concerning claiming a
composition of matter were so unsettled when the patent was granted
in 1869 that even the Patent Office’s own model specification and claim
for a composition of matter contained flaws highly similar to the ones
identified by the Court in Merrill as foreclosing any reading of the claim
to cover a product rather than a process. Identifying the meaning of a
patent claim once it has been issued is an inherently backward-looking
exercise because the claim is written at an earlier time in light of the
then-existing legal conventions and technological knowledge. Courts
interpreting patent claims and deciding the extent of patent rights have
to be wary of hindsight bias every bit as much as they do in deciding
patent validity issues such as obviousness.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, courts construing the
extent of patent rights should always be attentive to—in the Merrill
Court’s words—“that which was really invented.”151 Merrill is rightly
famous for elevating the importance of claims in defining patent rights,
but the case should be equally famous for continuing the tradition of
construing claims in light of the technological contribution of the
inventor. Linguistics alone will not do; nor will the often unsettled and
fluid rules of patent claiming. The one truly settled rule—the only rule
identified as a “rule” by Merrill—is that courts should try, if fairly
possible, to match the scope of patent rights to what was “really
invented.”

150. See, e.g., KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (instructing that courts
must be aware of the “distortion caused by hindsight bias” and “be cautious
of arguments reliant on ex post reasoning”). See also Zoltec Corp. v. United
States, 815 F.3d 1302, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (collecting precedents on the
unreliability of “[h]indsight reconstruction for litigation ends”).
151. Merrill, 94 U.S. at 573.
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